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A Ricardian Theory of Production, Trade and Finance - The Role of Credit 
Market Imperfection 
 
by 
Hamid Beladi 
Avik Chakraborti 
Sugata Marjit 
 
Abstract 
We build up a Ricardian trade model for a small open economy with imperfection in the market 
for credit which eventually affects the pattern of production and trade. Workers/entrepreneurs are 
endowed with different levels “capital” and need to borrow to produce the credit intensive good. 
Firms with strong internal cash flow will enter the credit intensive sector. Among those the 
weaker ones will like to deal in fragments and the richer ones will vertically integrate. Thus 
distribution of capital ownership determines the nature of production and trade. Those producing 
fragments may engage in external as well as internal trade. Two credit constrained nations may 
trade in fragments. The unconstrained richer firms will follow the standard Ricardian incentive to 
trade. Even if trade does not require credit, shortage of production credit will affect production 
and trade. Later we generalize our framework to determine prices and interest rate 
simultaneously. Even there is no role for trade credit, financial stringency will reduce volume of 
production and trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: F1, G1 
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I. Introduction 
  The recent global financial crisis and its far-reaching repercussions on cross-border 
economic activity, has renewed interest in roles that credit markets play in international trade.1 
Among the most recent landmark contributions, Manova (2013) provides convincing evidence 
that credit constraints are an important determinant of global trade flows. Similar concerns are 
also present in Chor and Manova (2012). While availability of trade credit is an essential element 
that facilitates trading process, our understanding of basic trade models remains incomplete if we 
do not bring in the role of credit in production and trade in general. The main purpose of this 
paper is to introduce credit in the basic Ricardian model and that too when credit is not easily 
available. In this paper credit market problems affect production pattern and resulting pattern of 
trade, internal and external. Thus we do not talk specifically about trade credit, but credit in 
general and we take such a perspective in terms of the most basic model of trade, the Ricardian 
framework. 
If a country, without having credit constraints, trades with another which is affected by the 
shortage of credit, it is likely that the credit constrained economy will specialize in fragments. In 
this case there is a comparative advantage story at work, the credit constrained economy has a 
comparative advantage in supplying fragments. The constrained economy also produces less of 
the credit intensive goods. We argue that firms which have adequate credit will exhibit very 
standard text book type Ricardian outcome. Paucity of credit will force a country to specialize 
mostly in non-credit intensive sector and those who are not so well endowed operating in the 
credit intensive sector will be better off producing fragments rather than the whole output. 
Let us, at the outset, highlight the difference between our work and two other papers, by 
Matsuyama (2005) and Deardorff (2000), that have brought to the fore-front the issue of credit 
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and finance in the context of trade and comparative advantage. Unlike Matsuyama (2005) our 
paper is not about corporate governance and contract enforcement and we deal with the 
Ricardian model and bank finance and do not talk about balance sheet of firms and determination 
of comparative advantage from that perspective. Instead we show how standard Ricardian 
outcomes are modified and altered when credit is expensive. Ours is fairly close to classical trade 
theoretic angle and what we feel should be the starting point for introducing credit in a proper 
trade model. Deardroff (2000) argues how during financial crisis fragmentation i.e. splitting up 
of production process in various traded segments, may create problems. On the contrary, in the 
paper the ability to trade in fragments actually helps to alleviate credit constraints. As such, our 
paper is different from both as we explicitly focus on credit market imperfection and 
fragmentation. 2 
Our paper also shows how trade promotes entrepreneurs and how trade actually helps the 
poor people more in relation to wealthier ones i.e. those endowed with higher initial amounts of 
capital or internal finance. We have to record our indebtedness to the classical economist David 
Ricardo who pioneered the wage fund theory of trade and growth and in the process emphasized 
the role of capital endowment in production and trade. Lineage wise this paper is also related to 
papers dealing with more ‘classical’ interpretation of the Ricardian theory of comparative 
advantage a’ la Steedman (1979) and Findlay (1984) and to the literature on north-south trade 
[Findlay (1995)]. 
 Our work draws from Jones and Marjit (2001) where fragmentation has been shown to help 
the young generation relative to the old who tend to own  capital. Such a young-old asymmetry 
not only corroborates Jones and Marjit (2001) conjecture, but also lends credence to the 
theoretical model under consideration where we show that constrained entrepreneurs will opt for 
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smaller size if they can. In Marjit (2008), relative capital endowments determine pattern of trade 
and occupational pattern simultaneously in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting, but the main focus was on 
wage distribution. While we produce a clear result where exactly similar countries gain from 
trade, a reinterpreted version in the context of the ‘north-south’ trade also yields an interesting 
result. The fact that a country faces credit market imperfection while the other does not, implies 
that the credit constrained economy will have a comparative advantage in producing fragments. 
Such a trade pattern echoes the earlier concern of trade between metropolis and colonies 
popularized through the literature on trade between centre and periphery. Two earlier attempts in 
modeling such a behavior without including capital are by Sanyal (1983) and Marjit (1987).  The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and presents the key 
results. Sections 3 and 4 look into further consequences of our results. In the final section, we 
draw our key conclusions.  
Section 2 .1                 Production and Trade in Final Good 
Consider an economy producing two goods –   and .  is produced with labor: ‘a’ units of 
labor produces one unit of . Production of  requires one period to complete and workers have 
to be paid at the beginning, thus entrepreneurs require credit for the wage fund. One unit of labor 
produces one unit of  . The distribution is given in a continuum such that each worker is 
represented by   0,1
. Each worker is endowed with a wage fund  called ‘capital’. In 
effect, we stylize a Ricardian small open economy, where workers are entrepreneurs, with 
commodity prices and interest rates determined in the rest of the world. However, the credit 
market is imperfect. If the workers so wish they can buy a bond which pays them , a return as a 
lender determined in the rest of the world. Thus, so far as the lending or deposit rates goes, it is 
fixed at . However, if they wish to borrow to augment their capital stock they must pay  > . 
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In the standard literature on credit market imperfection such divergence is a common occurrence. 
Such a summary view of the imperfect credit market has been quite popular in theories of 
occupational distribution and poverty trap. One can easily bring in adverse selection or moral 
hazard type assumptions to create an endogenous wedge between R and r. But that is not 
necessary for the purpose in hand.  
At this stage, we make an assumption that  is small enough for all  such that it falls short of 
the required wage fund to produce . Since to each worker-entrepreneur the imputed cost of 
producing is  , the alternative wage rate, our assumption suggests that  <   ∀ . Once they 
decide to borrow from the international market, the banks have to incur a loan processing cost, 
say,  > 1 in addition to  , the lending rate. Thus  =  >  As we shall see shortly given that 
 >  , internal source of financing such projects becomes crucial as predicted in the standard 
finance literature [Glenn Hubbard (1989)]. There are two aspects of the credit market 
imperfection problem.  
1. Specialized Intermediation: Banks will charge an intermediation cost leading to a gap 
between the borrowing rate (R) and the lending or deposit rate (r). In the popular poverty trap 
literature, (R – r) > 0 is used as a sufficient condition to characterize credit market 
imperfection. One can borrow as much as one desires, at R > r, implying that no credit 
constraint is effectively binding.  
2. Information Issues: The lender typically faces incomplete information regarding the type of 
the borrower, and decides the maximum amount of loan, internalizing any possibility of 
default. Such a maximum amount will be monotonically related with the endowment of the 
borrower. This defines the credit constraint [ (Aghion, Banerjee, & Piketty, 1999)] 
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In our setup we assume that 1  − 0 ≤ max loan granted to ‘0’th agent. Hence, we must 
stick to the intermediation cost only. But even we relax this assumption, our result will hold. We 
also assume competitive commodity markets where price has to be equal to average cost of 
production.  
With this backdrop, we can now specify the incentive of a representative worker to be an 
entrepreneur and engage in producing  rather than .     
 +   1 +  −   −  1 +   ≥    +  1 +    (1) 
where  ≡ #$#%. 
Note [1/a - k(z)] is nothing but the loan, L, taken from the bank and P has to be greater than 
L(1+R) plus k(z)(1+r), the cost of self-finance for production to be viable. 
If the worker/entrepreneur interested in producing y wishes to produce more than one unit of y 
and demand loan accordingly, one can easily show that given k (z) she will choose the minimum 
amount and assuming away fragments of y at this stage , it will boil down to the production of a 
single unit. Hence, the argument is more robust than the assumption of a single unit being 
produced. In a sense the scale of production is endogenous since fixity of k(z) works as capacity 
restriction. We shall extend it further to include production of fragments later in the paper. 
 
1 can be rewritten as 
 +  −  ≥   1 +       (2) 
 
In the absence of any imperfections in the credit market,  = . Hence, 2 boils down to  
 ≥  1 +        (3) 
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Internal financing becomes irrelevant as  vanishes from the scene with  = . (3) also 
suggests that whether the economy will specialize in  '  depend on whether the return from 
entrepreneurship  −  1 +   is positive. Complete specialization will be the likely outcome 
if P>  1 +  , replicating the fundamental and well known Ricardian proposition. In a way 
what we show is that the text book Ricardian model is a special case of this general framework 
with explicit role of finance or credit. 
Let us now rank   such that ′ > 0 for   0,1
with  + 1 −  >  1 + and 
 + 0 −  <  1 +  and define ̃ such that  
 + ̃ −  =  1 +       (4) 
It is obvious from (3) and (4) that since  < ,  any incentive to produce  is greater with a 
distorted credit market. However the net incentive, if any, to engage in production of  will be 
greater in an undistorted credit market, since the following holds 
 −   1 +  −  +  −  −  1 +  =  −   −  > 0 *  ≤   +'  ≤ ̃ . 
Since ′ > 0,  ∀   ≥ ̃ workers will become entrepreneurs in y and for the rest,  seems to be 
more profitable. Thus even if (3) holds with strict inequality, (4) may discourage all  < ̃ to 
become entrepreneurs in  , thus causing deviation from the first best allocation. Therefore, 
1 − ̃ will be the amount of  that will be produced and ,- will be the amount of  produced.  
Therefore, we have the first proposition. 
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Proposition 1  
With a perfect credit market and P >( 1/a)(1+r), all firms should specialize in producing x , 
the standard Ricardian equilibrium. If the credit market is imperfect in the sense described 
above and given the distribution of capital or internal finance, the set of poorest firms will 
be forced to specialize in x and the rest in y. Thus between two exactly similar countries if 
one does not face the credit constraint and the other does, the constrained economy will 
produce and export less of y, denoting a deviation from the first best allocation. 
 
Proof – See the discussion above. 
 
Section 2.2        Fragments 
Suppose  can be produced in fragments i.e. by splitting up the production process, `a la Jones 
and Kierzkowski (2001), so that if one firm produces λ fraction of the value, the other will 
produce (1- λ) fraction, exchange and mix them to produce one unit of  . The fraction is 
technologically given and we do not allow for optimal degree of fragmentation. We just allow 
the possibility that any firm operating in this small economy can produce a fragment and sell. It 
can sell to another firm within the country or outside the country. In the former case it is internal 
trade and for the latter, it is international trade.  Let us then rewrite the incentive constraint (1)  
λ  −  / 0  – kz 1 + R +  0 1 + r ≥ 0 1 + r + kz1 + r   (5) 
The entrepreneur gets λ fraction of the net value employing λ fraction of worker who can work 
(1- λ) fraction in x and get 0 1 + r in total and (5) can be rewritten as  
 + 6,/  −  ≥   1 +       (6) 
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Note that the LHS of (6) is greater than the LHS in (2), implying greater incentive to produce y. 
Also note that if R=r i.e. if the firm is rich enough, it does not gain by producing fragments since 
it does not need to save on the borrowing cost as it has enough internal finance. But this is 
important for a poorer firm. Figure 1 depicts ̃ in two different cases with ̃7 (in (6)) being less 
than ̃ (in (2)). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
As λ < 1, LHS in (6) is greater than RHS in (6) for ̃ =  ̃ , implying a drop in ̃ to ̃7.  We 
have drawn Figure 1 to indicate that  >  1 +  implies that if there is no distortion in the 
credit market, the economy would have specialized in y. If we allow trade in fragments ̃ drops 
and we have λ81 − z-λ9 working hours being spent on . Another important point is that the 
trading nations, both suffering from credit market imperfection, will trade without any reference 
to comparative advantage. It is possible that the closed economy can engage in internal trade 
when agents produce fragments of y. But whenever another country appears in the horizon, there 
will be inter-country trade provided technological considerations do not prohibit further 
fragmentation. The point we are trying to make is that, since  >  , there are latent 
(6) (2) 
̃ 
̃ ̃7 
P 
1
 1 +  
1
 1 +  
0 
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diseconomies of scale and fragmentation allows higher income. Will fragmentation allow greater 
production of y or more working hours spent on y as is desired by the first best allocation? 
The following proposition answers this question.  
Proposition 2. Trade in Fragments allows a movement towards first best allocation from 
autarky  i.e. (λ = 1)  iff ̃  > :;< where  ≡
6=,-
6,- ̃ 
Proof:  If  >  1 + , only y will be produced and we define it as the first best allocation 
where 
 ̃ = 0, All working hours are devoted to production of y.  
Given that ̃ =  >;?:@A# @AB     (from (6)),  
C/8A,-/9
C/ = 1 −  ̃ D1 + EF      (7) 
where G =  6H,-6,- ̃ > 0 denotes the elasticity of distribution of capital or wage fund stock with 
respect to ̃. Therefore, (7) will imply  
C/AI-/

C/ < 0 iff z- >  :;J  (8) 
If, initially (with λ = 1 ),  z- > :;J and we allow trade in fragments z- drops and given given (8) 
KL i.e. total allocation of labour in y increases and we move towards the first best. (QED)  
Proposition 1 clearly states that for z-  lower than 1 + E , trade in fragments will induce more 
people to be entrepreneurs but total allocation of labour for production of y will actually fall. As 
more people come into sector y, the existing ones allocate less working hours towards production 
of y. It is a tradeoff between extensive and intensive margin. Countries with smaller amounts of 
∀   are likely to generate a higher z-  at the initial equilibrium ( λ = 1  implying the 
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reluctance of the people to move into y as  >  . Surely, in such cases trade in fragments will 
lead to greater production of y and lower production of x. However, if initial z- is fairly low, 
further decline in ̃ may actually reduce production of y. Since 1 − ̃ is relatively high, a drop 
in λ , from λ = 1, impacts y more heavily which cannot be compensated by allowing more 
workers in production of y.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Let us now consider the possibility that at least some workers are endowed with enough 
capital so that they do not have to borrow. Since H > 0, let us stipulate some ̅ such that 
̅ =  , zN < 1  . Therefore, for zN, 1
, workers-entrepreneurs do not need to borrow.This 
incentive constraint boils down to 
P + 1a  1 + r + Qkz −
1
aR 1 + r ≥
1
a 1 + r + kz1 + r 
',  ≥ 1 1 +  
A 
B 
 
1
 1 +  
1
 1 +  
z ̃ ̃7 ̅ ̅7 1 0 
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In Figure 1, P exceeded  1 +  and, therefore, all such worker-entrepreneurs beyond ̅ 
would definitely produce y. Figure 2 summarizes the new equilibrium. Initially workers from 0 
to ̃  were engaged in x and ̃  to 1 were engaged in y. But for  ∈ ̅, 1 , the incentive 
constraint jumps down from A to B and coincides with the price line. With fragmentation ̃ 
declines up to ̃7 and declines up to 7̅.  
In fact, relatively rich workers i.e. indexed ̅ and beyond do not need to engage in trade in 
fragments since λ does not affect their incentive constraint. However, now more people do not 
face the constraint any more and 7̅ < ̃ . Thus the prediction of the model is that with credit 
constraints binding, relatively poor will engage in trade. Net benefit from trade, net of the 
opportunity cost is greater for those who face the credit constraint because for them having 
greater amount of internal finance provides an added benefit. For those who does not face the 
borrowing constraint own finances do not matter. While relatively rich will be reluctant to trade 
in fragments, relatively poor will be eager to engage in such a trade. Of course those who 
continue to produce x will not derive the benefit from trade in fragments. Thus the workers are 
divided into three categories. First, the poorest who wish to move into y sector but will find 
credit too costly to borrow and will produce . Second, those who will borrow and trade in 
fragments to produce  . Third, the richest ones who will produce y but will be indifferent 
towards trade in fragments.  
II. General Equilibrium with endogenous P and R 
In the preceding section we pinned down ̃ by 
 + ̃ −  =  1 +      (9) 
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P, R and r have been treated as given in our discussion so far. We continue to work with a 
deposit rate r given exogenously, but determine P and R as endogenous variables. 
Given k’>0, (9) implies that with an increase in P, ̃ will fall and ̃ will fall. Total production 
of Y denoted by (1 - ̃) will rise and as ̃ goes down, production of X will decline. Hence, 
T U = +      (10)        
where +H > 0. 
We close the model by a homothetic demand function 
VW
VX = Y      (11)        
where YH < 0. 
From (2) and (3) we determine the autarkic equilibrium relative price P0 and the rest of the 
variables given R and r. Note that we shall get identical relative price in both countries as they 
are exact replica of each other. P* is determined through the commodity market clearing 
condition given R and r. 
Now we turn to the capital market or, more precisely, working capital market equilibrium 
which should simultaneously hold with commodity market equilibrium. We continue to assume 
that banks have to offer a deposit rate r, set by international considerations, which remains 
exogenous to the system. R is determined through demand-supply interactions in the capital 
market. Given P, it is straight forward to state the supply-demand balancing condition in the 
capital market.  
Z[ ≡ \ ] + \  − 1  ],̅,-^   = \ 1 ,̅,- − ] ≡ ZC   (12) 
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                                                     Figure 3 
 
Consider the incentive constraint to participate in the production of Y.  
 − 1  1 +  + ̃ −  = 0        (13) 
Therefore, 8̃ − 1  9 + H̃̃H −  = 0         (14) 
Or, ̃H > 0 as ̃ < 1   and H̃ > 0 
An increase in R will raise Z[ and reduce ZC. Intersection of ZCand Z[, in figure 3, determines 
k* for a given P*.  
Finally, consider different combinations of (P*, k*) so that both commodity and capital 
markets are in equilibrium.  For a given P*, a rise in k* will increase ̃, reducing relative output of 
Y and will raise equilibrating P*. Thus, in Figure 4, we define an upward relation between (P*, 
R*) that clears the commodity market. Call it CC. Similarly, for a given R*, a rise in P* will 
reduce ̃, thus creating higher demand and lower supply of capital, thereby raising k*. Thus we 
construct KK.  
 
 
 
 
K 
R 
K* 
Kd 
Ks 
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                                                        Figure 4 
With the standard assumption that the commodity market equilibrium adjusts through a change 
in P* and the capital market equilibrium adjusts through a change in k*, we get the general 
equilibrium solution as (^∗,  ∗^) which is unique and stable. Now the autarkic equilibrium price 
needs to be compared with the rest of the world price to determine which good the country 
should export. One can easily show that even if one country faces a lower wage rate i.e. faces a 
relatively high “a” or unproductive x, compared to the other, most of the entrepreneurs will still 
crowd into x because they cannot get loans at a cheaper rate to produce y. On the other hand 
another country similarly poised but with a perfect credit market will eventually emerge as a 
winner by exporting y even if it does have a better x producing sector. The technological 
comparative advantage can be outweighed by credit disadvantage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R* 
P* 
K 
`a∗  
ba∗  
K 
C 
C 
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Proposition 3  
 During financial crisis if the credit availability is adversely affected through a rise in the 
global deposit rate r, P must rise, but R might not. However, (R-r) must go down in 
equilibrium. Thus countries exporting y will have to reduce production and export of y. 
Proof: 
At any given P and R, a rise in r must increase the cut off pint for participation in production of 
y, raising x and reducing y. That in turn increases P at any given R. Also as capital demand 
falters and supply increases, given P, R must fall. Thus in figure-4 CC shifts up and KK to the 
left, implying a rise in P. But R can move either way. But (R-r) must drop as the cut off k (z) 
cannot go down and P has to rise.  QED 
Point to note is that even if we do not have any explicit role of trade credit, credit shortage does 
affect production and reduce volume of exports. In fact as we have already argued, it can actually 
alter the pattern of trade. 
Fragmentation is likely to affect both CC and KK and will impact (^∗, ∗^). The equilibrium 
conditions are given by 
c,  = A,-@,#d-e,f
?
≡ g,          (15) 
Z[,  = ZC,           (16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    Figure 5 
k 
b 
K 
K 
C 
C 
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Equation (15) defines CC and (16) defines KK with ChC6 ∣jj> ChCB ∣kk for stability. Fragmentation 
potentially will affect both CC and KK. At a given (R,P), if we do not allow entry (i.e. if ̃ does 
not change), demand for capital will fall shifting KK to the left and CC upwards as supply of Y 
falls. If the effect of entry is not strong enough, the outcome can be visualized in figure 5. P is 
likely to increase, but R may move up or down depending on the price effect. The dominating 
entry effect can move CC and KK so that P may actually fall. Thus, fragmentation leads to 
greater efficiency by reducing the relative price of Y.  
As we open up trade in fragments we get different ̃ in both countries. Without loss of generality 
let us assume that the production process of Y can be divided into only two fragments of equal 
size. Such a division is technologically given which splits up the process in half.  
The way we have defined ̃ now is 
 + 6,- 7  −  = 1  1 +     (17) 
We have shown earlier that at any given P, ̃ will fall. Given P, we have same ̃ in both countries 
and they are lower. Total production of Y at a given P in each country is determined by  
T = 7 1 − ̃l     (18) 
Total production in each country will increase iff the following holds 
̃l < 2̃ − 1      (19) 
The condition above states that if the new ̃  is lower than the old one by a certain margin, total 
production in each country will increase and P will fall if we allow fragmentation. The 
significance of this result can be seen as follows. In the standard literature in industrial 
organization and financial economics (Nocke and Thanassoulis (2009)) credit constraints, that 
force the firms to choose smaller size or fragment, tend to increase price for the consumers due 
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to the problem of double marginalization. In this set up we can have a rising P as a consequence 
of fragmentation if we ignore the effect of fresh entry into the business by workers-entrepreneurs. 
But if we allow the entry effect to be significant fragmentation must reduce price as well and 
improve efficiency. Of course market structure does matter and efficiency of vertical relation 
will depend on price setting capacity of producers in an imperfectly competitive set up. But in 
that set up also one cannot ignore the consequent entry of firms who now find it profitable to 
engage in the production of Y. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
The main message of our paper is that inherently Ricardian economies constrained by the 
availability of credit, as reflected in a difference between the borrowing and the lending rate, will 
have a natural tendency to produce less of credit intensive good, will create less entrepreneurs,  
try to fragment production process to save the cost of borrowing etc. Such actions will lead to 
different outcomes when compared with a Ricardian world that enjoys perfect credit market. 
Richest set of firms will be like text book examples choosing to produce according to 
comparative advantage generated by technology as they do not  face credit constraints. The 
poorest will choose not to produce the credit intensive good, though they would very much like 
to do it if there were no such constraint. They are unable to exploit the rule of comparative 
technological advantage. The middle ones will switch groups depending on the price and 
borrowing cost. It is possible that identical countries will gain from trade by sharing production 
of the credit intensive good releasing the pressure on their internal finance. Smaller sized 
activities to some extent alleviate the problem of credit market imperfection. International trade 
in fragments allows firms to choose smaller size of output which suffers the credit constraint. 
Our results suggest that those with more than adequate amount of capital are not likely to engage 
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in such trade simply because internal financing does not assume a special role in this context. 
Relatively poor workers – entrepreneurs will engage in trade in intermediate or fragments. 
Fragmentation contributes in terms of encouraging entrepreneurs among the relatively poor 
echoing the observations in Jones and Marjit (2001). 
We have not dealt with credit rationing in this model and credit market imperfection does not 
lead to any kind of quantity constraint. The idea of credit constraint used in this paper is drawn 
from the standard development literature i.e. papers such as Galor and Zeira ( 1993) or texts such 
as Basu (2003). It will be interesting to work out the model with credit caps. Also how inequality 
of asset distribution can lead to trade and then affect the asset distribution itself through a 
dynamic mechanism is an issue needs to be addressed in future. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 Chor and Manova (2012) observe that credit conditions are an important channel through which 
financial crises affect trade volumes. 
2
 Manova and Yu (2012) find that credit-constrained firms, and financially underdeveloped countries as a 
whole, are restricted to low value-added stages of the supply chain. 
